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Abstract
Pricing to market (PTM) has been examined extensively in the recent trade literature
using Knetter’s (1989) model. The technique is typically applied using export unit values
that aggregate diﬀerentiated products. We examine the potential bias in PTM results
when using export unit values using a vertical diﬀerentiation model. We ﬁnd that: i) false
evidence of PTM (“pseudo PTM”) is always found due to aggregation when calculating
export unit values, whether the law of one price (LOP) holds or not; ii)when markets are
segmented, the fraction of pseudo PTM increases with the level of product diﬀerentiation.
Correspondingly, our simulation results suggest that: i) it is possible to get a statistically
signiﬁcant estimate of the exchange rate coeﬃcient, even when there is no real PTM; ii)
the signiﬁcance of the estimate increases with product diﬀerentiation.
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11 Introduction
Movements in exchange rates can have an important inﬂuence on an imperfectly competitive ex-
porter’s pricing behavior. Exchange rates create a wedge between the price set by the exporter
and the price paid by the importer and can be used as an instrument of price discrimination.
The idea that an exporter can adjust destination-speciﬁc markups to accommodate changes
in exchange rates was ﬁrst documented in Mann (1986) and later was termed “pricing-to-
market” (henceforth PTM) by Krugman (1987). Knetter (1989) developed an empirical model
to analyze the presence of PTM. Knetter’s model has since been used extensively, due to its
simplicity and data availability, to determine the presence of price discrimination in interna-
tional trade. Examples of studies include: Knetter (1989, 1993), Marston (1990), Gagnon and
Knetter (1995) in the auto industry; Pick and Carter (1994), Carew (2000), Griﬃth and Mullen
(2001), Rakotoarisoa and Shapouri (2001), Carew and Florkowski (2003), Glauben and Loy
(2003) in the food and agriculture industry; Kan (2001) in the textile industry; Takeda and
Matsuura (2003) in the DRAM industry; Bodnar, Dumas and Marston (2002) in industries
including construction machinery and copies etc., and Mahdavi (2002) in 13 manufacturing
industries.
Most PTM studies, such as those listed above, use export unit values as the price variable.1
Export unit values are calculated as the ratio of value to volume of exports for a speciﬁc product
category and destination country. Market- or customer-speciﬁc price information is typically
conﬁdential, making export unit values the next best alternative. The disadvantage of export
unit values is that they often aggregate data on products employed for very diﬀerent uses. In
fact, Gehlhar and Pick (2002) found that 40 percent of U.S. food exports are characterized by
non-price competition, such as product diﬀerentiation. For those products, they argue that
unit values are poor measures of prices in international trade. Thus, observation of PTM
could be an indication of product diﬀerentiation (Sexton and Lavoie, 2001). It is important
to understand the eﬀect of the use of unit values on PTM testing because evidence, or lack of
evidence, of PTM can be used for policy purposes, e.g., Carter (1993). Moreover, PTM can
have important eﬀects on the international transmission of monetary and ﬁscal policy, and can
increase exchange rate volatility, relative to a situation where markets are integrated (Betts
and Devereux, 2000). The objective of our study is to examine the impact of the use of unit
values characterized by vertical product diﬀerentiation on the evaluation of pricing-to-market.
1Few exceptions include Gron and Swenson (2000), Goldberg and Verboven (2001) and Stefano (2003), which
use product level data.
2Product diﬀerentiation has been explicitly modelled in studies evaluating the extent of
exchange rate pass-through (e.g., Dornbusch (1987), Feenstra, Gagnon, and Knetter (1996),
Yang (1997), Bodnar, Dumas and Marston (2002)).2 Gron and Swenson (2000) also considered
input substitutability in their study of cost pass-through in the U.S. automobile market. In the
studies listed above, substitution occurs between a good produced by the home ﬁrm and a good
produced by the foreign ﬁrm. Our analysis of product diﬀerentiation diﬀers from the above
studies in two respects. First, substitution occurs between a set of vertically diﬀerentiated
goods produced in one country and sold domestically and to a foreign market. Second, we
address the issue of product diﬀerentiation in the context of the use of unit export values as
price data to detect the presence of PTM.
The issue of product diﬀerentiation in the use of unit values is acknowledged in many
PTM studies using Knetter’s model. Common criticisms of the use of unit values are that
“they do not account for quality diﬀerences across shipments to diﬀerent countries or quality
changes over time in the product under consideration” (Gil-Pareja, 2002, p.301).3 Authors,
such as Knetter (1989), typically argue that systematic diﬀerences in product quality, such as
when diﬀerent qualities are shipped to diﬀerent markets, can be captured by country dum-
mies. Moreover, changes in the quality of the product that is common across countries can
be captured by time eﬀects.4 Thus, the impact of product diﬀerentiation on the evaluation of
PTM is typically argued to be minimal.
While prior authors acknowledge the problems associated with unit values when they reﬂect
diﬀerent qualities shipped to diﬀerent countries, we address an issue that to our knowledge has
not been addressed before. Namely, that movements in the exchange rates can alter the mix
of qualities imported by countries, and as a result cause false detection of PTM.5 Our paper
represents a ﬁrst step into the impact of using export unit values on the evaluation of PTM.
We introduce a conceptual model where a monopolist sells vertically diﬀerentiated products
to a domestic and a foreign market. Two scenarios are of interest. In the ﬁrst one, there is
perfect and costless consumer arbitrage, and the law of one price (LOP) holds for individual
2Exchange rate pass-through refers to the extent to which the price to a given importing country adjusts to
changes in the exchange rate.
3See also Alston, Carter, and Whitney (1992), and Goldberg and Knetter (1997) for discussions on the use
of unit values in the evaluation of PTM.
4Gil-Pareja contends that estimating a PTM regression in ﬁrst diﬀerences also alleviates the problems asso-
ciated with the use of unit values.
5Gil-Pareja pointed out that using unit values can be problematic when there are destination-speciﬁc changes
in the quality levels of shipments.
3products (i.e., before aggregation). In the second scenario, consumer arbitrage is not feasible
and markets are segmented. We derive the equilibrium prices and quantities and use them to
calculate unit values. In both scenarios, we ﬁnd the presence of “pseudo PTM”, i.e., PTM
that is purely the result of data aggregation and product diﬀerentiation rather than price
discrimination across markets. In the ﬁrst scenario, there is pseudo PTM only. In the second
scenario, there is pseudo and “real PTM,” i.e., PTM due to market segmentation. We show that
the fraction of pseudo PTM increases with the level of product diﬀerentiation.6 Next we employ
a Monte Carlo simulation to analyze the relationship between PTM and the level of product
diﬀerentiation. More speciﬁcally, we quantify the threshold level of product diﬀerentiation
necessary to generate statistically signiﬁcant evidence of PTM. The simulation and regression
results indicate a higher statistical signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient indicating PTM when there
is real and pseudo PTM. Moreover, in both cases, a higher level of product diﬀerentiation is
more likely to lead to a statistically signiﬁcant evidence of PTM.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The conceptual model is presented in section
2 and the two scenarios are analyzed in section 3. Section 4 provides a simulation study and
we summarize the results in section 5. Proofs of propositions can be found in the appendix.
2 The model
Consider two countries: country 1 and 2. A monopolist in country 1 produces two vertically
diﬀerentiated products with exogenous qualities ql and qh (0 < ql < qh). The two goods are
sold domestically and exported to country 2.7 The marginal cost is 1
2q2
j for the product of
quality qj (j = l,h).8
We model the vertical diﬀerentiation ` a la Mussa and Rosen (1978). Consumers are hetero-
geneous in their preferences for quality. A consumer with preference parameter θ will enjoy a
utility of θq −p if she buys one unit of the product of quality q at price p, and zero if she buys
6This is in the same spirit as in Bodnar, Dumas and Marston (2002), who ﬁnd that the impact of higher
product substitutability (higher ρ) is to moderate the exchange rate pass-through, using a model where an
exporting ﬁrm and a foreign import-competing ﬁrm produce products of various substitutability.
7We use “market” and “country” interchangeably in this paper.
8Marginal cost is assumed constant with respect to quantity for simplicity. The choice of a quadratic
functional form with respect to quality derives from the uninteresting outcome that results from choosing a
linear functional form such as cj = qj. Namely, the monopolist does not sell the low-quality product. In
general, whenever ch/cl = qh/ql or cj = 0, the monopolist sets pl = ph
ql
qh. As a result, the price quality ratio
for each good is the same, and consumers are indiﬀerent between the high-quality and the low-quality product.
4nothing. There is a continuum of consumers in each country, i.e. θ ∈ U[0,θi] with density 1/θi
in country i (i = 1,2).
Let θil (i = 1,2) denote the consumer in market i who is indiﬀerent between buying the
low- quality product or buying nothing, that is, θil is the value of θ that solves θql − pl = 0.9
Similarly θih is the consumer in market i who is indiﬀerent between buying the low- or high-
quality product, i.e., θih is the value of θ that solves θqh −ph = θql −pl. Thus consumers with
θ ∈ [0,θil) will not buy, those with θ ∈ [θil,θih] will buy low quality product and the others
(θ ∈ (θih,θi]) will buy the high-quality product.













Krugman (1987) described the evidence of PTM as that the import price (relative to
exporter’s domestic price) fails to change (fall or rise) proportionately to the exchange rate
change (appreciation or depreciation).
Following the same logic, Marston (1990) describes the presence of PTM by the “export-
domestic price margin.” It is calculated as the ratio of country 2’s price to country 1’s price
(P2
P1), where Pi is the price in country i, expressed in country 1’s currency. This ratio equals
one when there is no PTM, i.e., the prices expressed in the same currency are equal.
In this paper, we use X = P1
P2/e
10 to analyze the presence of PTM, where P1 and P2 are
all in local currencies and e is the exchange rate expressed in units of country 2’s currency per
unit of country 1’s currency. There is no PTM if X = 1. The PTM eﬀect can be measured as
the eﬀect of a change in the exchange rate on X. Thus, when there is PTM, a change in the
exchange rage will have a non-zero impact on the ratio X. Said diﬀerently, there is pricing to
market when the exporter responds to a change in the exchange rate by varying the price to
one or both markets not proportionally.
We consider two scenarios. In the ﬁrst scenario, consumers can resell their products across
countries without incurring any cost. In this scenario, LOP holds for each individual product,
and the prices of each product in the two markets are the same after being converted into the
9Throughout the paper, prices are all in local currencies.
10This ratio will prove to be more straightforward to interpret than Marston’s ratio in what follows.
5same currency. In the other scenario, markets are segmented and arbitrage between consumers
across countries is not feasible. Consequently, the two markets are independent and each
product is sold by the monopolist at a diﬀerent price in each country.
3 Analysis
In this section, we solve for the equilibrium price and quantities in both scenarios. The mo-
nopolist’s objective is to maximize its proﬁt by choosing prices. Using equilibrium prices and
quantities, we calculate unit values of sales to each country, expressed in country’s 1 currency.
Recall that unit values are used as prices in empirical applications. We use the unit values to
calculate the domestic-export price margin (X). “Evidence” of PTM occurs when this ratio is
not equal to one, or when a change in the exchange rate has a non-zero impact on X.
We begin with the ﬁrst scenario where the LOP holds for each individual product.
Scenario 1. LOP holds
The non-discriminatory monopolist chooses the prices pl and ph (in country 1’s currency)












where dil(pl,ph) and dih(pl,ph) are the demand functions for the low- and high-quality
product in country i (i = 1,2) as derived in section 2. Note however that the prices pl and ph
are in country 1’s currency, whereas consumers’ demand in market 2 is a function of the price
in the local currency, i.e., pl · e and ph · e, where e is the exchange rate. We assume that in
equilibrium the monopolist produces both products and sells to both countries.11
From the ﬁrst-order conditions, we obtain the equilibrium prices p∗
l and p∗
h and the equi-
librium quantities d∗
il and d∗
il for market i (i = 1,2). The unit value Pi is computed as the










The presence of PTM is determined by computing X = P1
P2/e and evaluating whether it is
equal to one or varies with the exchange rate.
11It can be easily shown that the monopolist is better oﬀ supplying both products than supplying either
product in both scenarios, under the parameters we assign.
6Our results are summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 1 When the LOP holds for individual products, there is pseudo PTM due to
aggregation.
Proof. See appendix.
The intuition of why aggregation leads to pseudo PTM is as follows. Note that the domestic-
export price ratio is12
X =
(pld1l + phd1h)/(d1l + d1h)













plσ1 + ph(1 − σ1)
plσ2 + ph(1 − σ2)
where σi =
dil
dil+dih,i = 1,2, is the fraction of low-quality product in country i.
Note that a change in exchange rate will change all the equilibrium prices and quantities.



















We need θ2 = eθ1 to have σ1 = σ2. But θ2 is a ﬁxed parameter, which can not vary with
the exchange rate. Therefore, σ1 = σ2 can not hold when e varies, and there is always pseudo
PTM.
Numerical example
To get a sense of the pseudo PTM, we give a numerical example. Suppose that ql = .3,
qh = .7, θ1 = 1 and θ2 = 2. Applying the results in the appendix, the equilibrium prices are










e+2 .13 The ratio of the unit prices, as the following, is clearly a
function of exchange rate e, instead of a constant.
X =
(2956e − 1364 + 219e2)(3e2 + 6e − 160)
(37e − 6)(804e2 + 244e + 61e3 − 15040)
Next, we analyze the second scenario, where markets are segmented and consumer arbitrage
is not feasible.
Scenario 2. Market segmentation
In this scenario, the monopolist charges pij (all in local currencies) to country i (i = 1,2)
for product of quality qj (j = l,h). The monopolist is able to charge diﬀerent prices in diﬀerent
markets, and each market can be treated independently because of the assumption of constant
marginal cost with respect to quantity.
Deﬁne Xl as the domestic-export price margin for the low-quality product and Xh, as that
for the high-quality product. A ratio diﬀerent from one or varying with changes in exchange
rate indicates that the monopolist price discriminates. Thus, Xl or Xh diﬀerent from zero
indicates real PTM. The next proposition summarizes the results in this scenario.
Proposition 2 When markets are segmented,















ii) There is also pseudo PTM due to aggregation.
Proof. See appendix.
Because only the equilibrium quantities in market 2 are aﬀected by movements in the
exchange rate, the domestic-export price ratio (X = P1
P2/e) corresponds to,















where σ2 is the fraction of low-quality product in market 2.
This ratio shows the presence of real PTM through Xl and Xh, which was missing in
the ﬁrst scenario. There is also pseudo PTM through σ2 due to aggregation, same as in the
previous scenario.
Now we know that pseudo PTM is due to the aggregation of diﬀerentiated products, it
is interesting to analyze the relationship between the fraction of pseudo PTM and the level
of product diﬀerentiation. We obtain various levels of product diﬀerentiation by ﬁxing ql
and varying qh. A higher qh would imply a higher level of product diﬀerentiation. The next
corollary summarizes our results.
Corollary 3 When markets are segmented, the fraction of pseudo PTM increases with the
level of product diﬀerentiation.
Proof. To get a sense of how X,Xl and Xh vary with the level of product diﬀerentiation
(qh), we assign some parameter values, and plot these three measures against qh. We set
ql = 3
10, θ1 = 1, θ2 = 2, e = 3.14 The results are provided in Figure 1.
While these are numerical results, some observations are worth notifying. First, there is
always pseudo PTM, since in the graph X is always higher than max{Xl,Xh}. Second, pseudo
PTM increases with the level of product diﬀerentiation. This is because while Xl and Xh
are either stable or decreasing with the level of product diﬀerentiation, X increases with qh.15
This implies that, as products become more diﬀerentiated, the real PTM for each product
stays stable or decreases, and the aggregate PTM increases. Therefore, the fraction of pseudo
PTM increases with the level of product diﬀerentiation.
14All quantities and prices are positive under these parameter values.
15The observation that Xh decreases with qh might seem counterintuitive initially. One explanation is that,
we assume θ1 = 1 and θ2 = 2, i.e. there are relatively more consumers who care more about quality in the
second market. As a result, when qh increases and prices of high quality product increase in both markets, price
increase in the second market may be relatively more as the monopolist is able to get relatively more out of the
second market.
9Figure 1: PTMs and product diﬀerentiation
An alternative way to see this is to calculate an approximate fraction of pseudo PTM in
the whole PTM, and analyze its relationship with the level of product diﬀerentiation. Since
the real PTM originates from the real PTM in both individual products, we assume that the
fraction of real PTM using unit prices is the average of the real PTMs for both individual
products, i.e., 1
2(Xl + Xh). Then the fraction of pseudo PTM is




(10qh − 3)(76577 + 44700q2
h + 111410qh)
1519(3qh + 4)(100q2
h + 30qh − 409)
This fraction is plotted against qh in Figure 2. One can see clearly that the fraction of
pseudo PTM increases with qh - the level of product diﬀerentiation.
4 Simulations
Previous theoretical results indicate that when sales to a given market involve diﬀerentiated
products and unit values are used to evaluate the prices of PTM, there is always pseudo
PTM due to aggregation. Pseudo PTM arises as a result of a change in the mix of qualities
purchased due to a change in the exchange rate. Thus, it is possible, as in scenario 1, that
10Figure 2: The fraction of pseudo PTM and product diﬀerentiation
the law of one price holds, but PTM is observed falsely because of the aggregation of diﬀerent
quality products in the calculation of unit values. Moreover, we show that the contribution of
pseudo PTM to total PTM increases with the level product diﬀerentiation. This implies that
in regression analysis following Knetter (1989), the exchange rate coeﬃcient may pick up the
eﬀects of pseudo PTM. Next we conduct a Monte Carlo simulation to answer the following two
questions:
i) Is it possible to get statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of exchange rate when there is
actually no real PTM?
ii) Does the signiﬁcance level increase with the level product diﬀerentiation, whether there
is real PTM or not?
The model we estimate is the following,
logXt = β0 + β1 loget + Ut (1)
where et ∼ U[a,b] is the exchange rate, Xt is the domestic-export price ratio, generated as
P1(et)+1
P2(et)+2. Pi(et), i = 1,2 are the unit values computed as described in each scenario of section
3, i ∼ N(0,σ2) and E(12) = 0.
If there is no PTM, the domestic-export price ratio (and its log) should be independent
11of the exchange rate and β1 should be statistically insigniﬁcant. By analyzing the estimate
of β1 under diﬀerent levels of product diﬀerentiation, we can evaluate the eﬀect of product
diﬀerentiation on pseudo PTM.
We estimate the above model under the two scenarios examined in section 3. Parameters
are chosen to ensure that all quantities and prices are positive. For both scenarios, we set
a = 1.5, b = 2.5 and σ = 1/15. The parameters of the theoretical model are the same as in
section 4, i.e. θ1 = 1, θ2 = 2, and ql = .3. The number of draws is 100 for the ﬁrst scenario and
75 for the second scenario.16 We conduct three trials for each level of product diﬀerentiation
(qh). The results are provided in the tables 1 and 2.
Table 1: β1 under the LOP scenario
qh Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3
estimate Pr > |t| estimate Pr > |t| estimate Pr > |t|
0.4 0.15398 0.2945 0.05886 0.6909 -0.01016 0.9515
0.5 0.32780 0.0025 0.27939 0.0169 0.54944 < .0001
0.6 0.39157 0.0003 0.86776 < .0001 0.59411 < .0001
0.7 0.92054 < .0001 0.91363 < .0001 0.89571 < .0001
Table 2: β1 under the market segmentation scenario
qh Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3
estimate Pr > |t| estimate Pr > |t| estimate Pr > |t|
0.4 0.27907 0.5368 1.31023 0.0048 1.98118 < .0001
0.5 0.84896 0.0022 0.73828 0.0504 0.81466 0.0081
0.6 0.85509 < .0001 1.02160 0.0001 1.08151 < .0001
0.7 1.03067 < .0001 1.48639 < .0001 1.56314 < .0001
Table 1 is consistent with our theoretical results which indicate that when products are
suﬃciently diﬀerentiated (qh ≥ .5 in our setup), statistically signiﬁcant result suggesting PTM
can be obtained, although there is no real PTM. Table 2 reﬂects scenario 2 where there is
16In the second scenario with real PTM, when the number of draws is set to 100, statistically signiﬁcant
estimate of β1 are always obtained, even when the level of product diﬀerentiation is small. When we set the
number of draws to 50, the regression results are fairly unstable. Thus we pick 75 draws to avoid these problems.
12both real and pseudo PTM. It is interesting to note in this case, that even though there is real
PTM, the coeﬃcient on the exchange rate is not statistically signiﬁcant until there is suﬃcient
product diﬀerentiation, i.e., qh ≥ .5. Second, as product diﬀerentiation (i.e. qh) increases, the
level of signiﬁcance increases. This is consistent with the corollary to proposition 2. Finally,
in many instances, the signiﬁcance level (1 − p-value) is higher in the second scenario. This is
intuitive, given that there is pseudo as well as real PTM in this case.17
5 Concluding remarks
The pricing-to-market (PTM) model of Knetter (1989) has been used widely in the recent
empirical trade literature to determine the presence of price discrimination across international
markets. The technique has been used extensively due to its simplicity and data availability.
Most PTM studies use export unit values as the price variable. Export unit values typically
aggregate products that are diﬀerentiated. In this study, we examine the extent to which false
result of PTM (pseudo PTM) arises from the use of unit value data.
For that purpose, we develop a vertical diﬀerentiation model to derive demands for two
products of diﬀerent qualities produced by a monopolist. These products are sold domestically
and exported to a foreign market. There is evidence of PTM when the ratio of the domestic
price to the export price (expressed in domestic currency’s unit) is diﬀerent from one or is
aﬀected by a change in the exchange rate.
To determine whether the use of unit values result in false detection of PTM we examine
two scenarios. In the ﬁrst scenario, we assume that arbitrage between the two markets prevails
and the monopolist is forced to charge the same price to both markets, i.e., the law of one price
(LOP) holds. When using unit values, regardless of the values of the parameter chosen, we
ﬁnd that there is always pseudo PTM even though markets are truly integrated. In the second
scenario, arbitrage is not possible and the same product is sold at diﬀerent prices in diﬀerent
markets. In this case, we ﬁnd evidence of both real and pseudo PTM when using unit values.
Unit values consist of an average price of products sold to a market. Pseudo PTM occurs
when the LOP holds because a movement in the exchange rate causes a change in the mix of
qualities purchased, thus aﬀects the ratio of unit values. In the second scenario where markets
are segmented, the change in the exchange rate aﬀects the ratio of unit values through two
17Note also that the estimate of the coeﬃcient increases with qh. This can be veriﬁed using our theoretical
results by calculating
∂ln X
∂ln e , and seeing that it increases with qh.
13channels: 1) a true PTM eﬀect, 2) a change in the composition of the qualities purchased
within each country.
In the second scenario, we also determine that the contribution of pseudo PTM to the
ﬁnding of PTM increases with product diﬀerentiation, thus increasing the likelihood of false
detection of PTM in empirical work. To test the hypothesis that product diﬀerentiation in-
creases statistical ﬁnding of PTM, we conduct a Monte Carlo simulation. For both scenarios,
we determine the threshold value of product diﬀerentiation necessary to obtain a statistically
signiﬁcant evidence of PTM. We ﬁnd such threshold for scenario 1 even though there is no real
PTM. The results also show that the statistical signiﬁcance of the exchange rate coeﬃcient
(indicating the presence of PTM) increases with product diﬀerentiation. In addition to ﬁnding
similar results for scenario 2, we also observe that the statistical signiﬁcance of this coeﬃcient
in greater in scenario 2 where there is both real and pseudo PTM.
These ﬁndings imply that when unit values characterize suﬃciently diﬀerentiated products,
false evidence of PTM is found. Our results should serve to caution users of the approach to
evaluate the level of diﬀerentiation present in the product category chosen and to interpret
the results accordingly. Alternatively, more conﬁdence can be placed on results obtained using
disaggregated data. Such caution is especially important when results are used for policy
purposes.
14APPENDIX: Proofs of propositions
Proof of proposition 1
First, we derive the equilibrium price and quantity of each product in each market. In
country 1, the consumer indiﬀerent between buying the low-quality product or buying nothing
is deﬁned by the value of θ solving θql − pl = 0, i.e., θ1l =
pl
ql. Similarly, the consumer
indiﬀerent between the low- and high-quality products is deﬁned by the value of θ solving
equation θqh − ph = θql − pl, i.e. θ1h =
ph−pl
qh−ql.
Thus the low-quality product is purchased by consumers with θ ∈ [θ1l,θ1h] and the demand







The high-quality product is purchased by consumers with θ ∈ (θih,θi] and the demand for







The demands for the low- and high-quality products in country 2 can be obtained in a
similar manner. Note however that the demands of consumers in country 2 depend on the
price of the product expressed in local currency, i.e., pl · e and ph · e, where e is the exchange
rate expressed in units of country 2’s currency per unit of country 1’s currency.











= 1 − e
ph − pl
(qh − ql)θ2
The ﬁrm’s proﬁt is
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B = (θ2qle + e2qlθ1 − 4θ2
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16It can be shown that no combination of parameter choices (ql,qh,θ1,θ2) can lead to a
constant X = 1, with e being a variable. Based on our previous explanation, there is PTM.
However, in this scenario markets are not segmented and the LOP holds, i.e., the monopolist
is unable to treat the two markets diﬀerently. As there is no real PTM, we call this pseudo
PTM.
Proof of proposition 2
The monopolist treats each market independently due to market segmentation and constant















































































4qlp1h − 4p1lqh + q2







l − 2θ1qh + 2θ1ql + 4p1h − q2
h
2(−qh + ql)θ1









ql(2θ1 + ql) (2)







2θ1 − ql − qh
4θ1
(3)
Similarly, by solving the maximization problem of the monopolist in country 2, we can
















2θ2 − e(ql + qh)
4θ2
(5)
Because markets are segmented and treated independently by the monopolist, the equilib-
rium prices and quantities in market 1 are not aﬀected by movements in the exchange rates
whereas the exchange rate aﬀects the equilibrium prices and quantities in market 2. Thus,



















By substituting the expressions for the equilibrium prices and quantities of the low- and
high-quality products in each market (equations (2) − (5)), we can obtain, after some simpli-










h + e2qlqh − 4θ2
2 − q2
l e2)
A change in the exchange rate has a non-zero impact on this ratio indicating the presence
of PTM. However, we have shown above that in this case, there is real and pseudo PTM. Real
18PTM is attributable to the monopolist charging diﬀerent prices to diﬀerent markets for the
same quality product. Pseudo PTM is attributable to the use of unit values, which average
the price for diﬀerent quality products. A change in the exchange rate causes a change in the
mix of quality imported causing a non-zero impact on the unit value to market 2.
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